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Erica Goldring 
 
The Rising Storm: How New Jersey Beach Replenishment Projects And Just Compensation 
Are Not The Answers To The Water Management Crisis 
 
Part I: Introduction 
 
Property law is founded on concepts of stability, but the growth of hurricanes and flooding 
on New Jersey beaches make coastal residential life unstable.  To remedy this growing concern, 
New Jersey implemented a public project to build sand dunes along the Jersey Shore.  Since some 
beachfront property owners would not voluntarily relinquish easements, the government has 
“taken” land for sand dunes through its eminent domain power.  This spawned litigation 
concerning the value of just compensation for the partial takings.  In 2013, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court created a new standard for partial takings compensation, which now allows juries to consider 
not only the loss of value but also the benefits the sand dunes confer on property owners in the 
form of storm protection.  This new standard helps prevent windfalls to property owners, but also 
promotes the government’s role in using structural mitigation techniques to “protect” against rising 
sea levels and natural disasters.  Scholars such as Daniel Barnhizer and Henk Ovink argue that this 
is not enough: They contend that America must implement new forms of water management for 
true long-term protection.  Instead of revising compensation equations to save the government 
short-term money, America must adapt to new ideas and policies of water management in the face 
of ever increasing climate change.   
A detailed inquiry into the interconnectedness of property law, land development, and 
climate change is discussed in this note.  Section I examines how natural disasters and resulting 
government initiatives uproot our basic understandings of property law.  Section II explains how 
New Jersey’s response to recent hurricanes has created problems for coastal development and has 
led to tug-of-war litigation between property owners and the government.  Section III discusses 
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how other countries are responding to inevitable rising sea levels and how America could benefit 
from a new perspective on coastal land use.  Finally, Section IV concludes. 
Part II: A Theoretical Approach to Property Rights and the Effects of Natural Disasters 
 
Environmental transformations resulting from sudden natural phenomena effectuate 
changes in property law.1  Common characteristics shared by large-scale natural upheavals 
include: (1) suddenness; (2) unexpectedness; (3) intense societal disruption and (4) vast geographic 
extension.2  These factors are not all inclusive or dispositive; rather they are indicative of past 
examples of “radically changed circumstances.”3  One effect of natural disasters on property law 
concerns the relationships between property owners and shared or common resources.4   
Since property law is founded on concepts of stability,5 the effects of natural disasters 
present a challenge by imposing conditions of upheaval and unpredictability.6  Often, these natural 
disasters occur as the result of climate change, which is inherently uncertain.7  Property owners 
may be faced with fear of losing resources that are central to a stable life.8   
In the aftermath of a natural disaster, there are several repeat problems that property owners 
tend to face.  First, property owners may seek to preserve or conserve a common resource.9  They 
will have to address difficult questions to determine the appropriate course of action.10  These 
questions often involve allocation of responsibility, ability for resource improvement, consent 
                                                        
1 John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REV. 463, 470 (2007). 
2 Id. at 473. 
3 Id. at 470. 
4 Id. at 474. 
5 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 538 (2005). 
6 Lovett, supra note 1, at 476. 
7 See generally JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 287 (2005) (discussing 
how societies around the world have responded to dramatic environmental shifts). 
8 Lovett, supra note 6. 
9 Symeon C. Symeonides & Nicole Duarte Martin, The New Law of Co-Ownership: A Kommentar, 68 TUL. L. REV. 
69, 113 (1993). 
10 Lovett, supra note 1, at 481. 
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among commoners, financial reimbursement, and default property law rules.11  Second, property 
owners must contemplate and make decisions on whether substantial physical alterations or 
improvements of common resources should occur due to changed environmental circumstances.12  
Last, property owners are likely to address the effects of individuals’ exit and entrance from 
property relationships.13  Embedded in these questions is the state’s role in facilitating functional 
property relationships to uphold the public welfare.  More specifically, the question is raised: What 
is the extent of protection afforded to property regimes by federal disaster aid and disaster 
protection laws?14 
New natural disaster laws may help property owners move from a reactive approach to a 
proactive one.15  In New Jersey, the devastation surrounding Superstorm Sandy in 2012 implicated 
a host of restrictive provisions.16  For example, when New Jersey was deemed a “state of 
emergency,” price gouging was prohibited and mandatory overtime restrictions for healthcare 
personnel were lifted.17  But in the wake of the storm, New Jersey is now retrospectively regulating 
against future natural disaster destruction.18  Specifically, flood prevention measures not agreed to 
by coastal property owners have become a major public initiative backed by the State’s eminent 
domain power.19   
The taking of private property in post-hurricane recovery periods has widespread 
                                                        
11 Id. at 482. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 482-83. 
14 Joshua F. Cheslow, The Future of the Law Four Practice Areas on the Horizon, NEW JERSEY LAWYER 
MAGAZINE, August 2013, at 35, 36. 
15 Id. at 35. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 36. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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consequences to reshaping devastated areas.20  Though State condemnation power has been 
deemed both constitutional and useful when exercised to benefit a public use, property owners 
affected by natural disasters also desire a say in the policy that affects them.21   
Part III: Beach Replenishment and Partial Takings 
  
 A. New Jersey’s Waterfront Evolution 
 
New Jersey’s use of eminent domain power to carry out public beach replenishment 
projects after Sandy stems from the State’s storm damage reduction initiative, beginning in 1999.22  
Coastal municipalities, in collaboration with the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection (“NJDEP”) and the United States Army Corps Engineers designed a project to combat 
shoreline erosion along Long Beach Island.23  Efforts included pumping 11 million cubic yards of 
sand into the area, with an additional two million cubic yards of sand every seven years for the 
next 50 years, and construction of sand dunes with specific height restrictions based on the 
locations.24  In order to build the dunes, voluntary easements were needed from coastal property 
owners.25  For many beachfront residents, this property right was not easily relinquished and 
caused municipalities to take legal action.26 
 In 2009, President Barack Obama enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
which provides extensive funding for science, engineering research, and infrastructure.27  Within 
                                                        
20 Shelby C. Stone, Two Tales of One City: Eminent Domain Post-Katrina and A Response to Kelo, 53 LOY. L. REV. 
115, 117 (2007). 
21 Kevin Ramakrishna, Subduing the Ceaseless Storm: Breaking the Build-Destroy-Rebuild Cycle Following Major 
Catastrophes Through Taxation and Responsibility, 2 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 328, 333 (2009). 
22 Water Resources Development Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-53, 106th Cong. §§ 337–39 (1999). 
23 NJDEP BUREAU OF COASTAL ENG’G, BEACH NOURISHMENT (2012). 
24 NJ DEP’T OF ENG’R, BARNEGAT INLET TO LITTLE EGG INLET: FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT AND INTEGRATED FINAL 
ENVTL IMPACT STATEMENT A (1999). 
25 Id. at 1. 
26 MaryAnn Spoto, Fight Against Emergency Beach Replenishment Causing Waves Among Shore Towns, NJ.COM 
(Apr. 13, 2012, 8:04AM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/04/emergency_beach_replenishment.html. 
27 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 516 (2009). 
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New Jersey’s share of the Act, the state government created its own New Jersey Recovery and 
Reinvestment Plan, allocating $51,259,000 worth of public funding for beach replenishment 
projects along the state’s coastline.28  Beach replenishment is a process that restores eroded 
shorelines, but does not prevent future erosion.29  Therefore, beach replenishment projects are not 
a long-term solution, particularly with the threat posed by rising sea levels.30  Under the New 
Jersey Recovery and Reinvestment Plan, however, the State took a proactive approach, mandating 
sand dune easements from private beachfront property owners as a condition precedent to 
administering public funds.31  
 Although New Jersey’s plan specifies a fifty-year replenishment period, coastal property 
owners recognize that continuous beach maintenance will extend far into the future.32  Beach 
replenishment requires perpetually ongoing work to remain effective due to the natural forces of 
wind, water, and land.33  As such, many attempts by State agencies to acquire private easements 
have been unsuccessful due to concerns about declining property values and never-ending beach 
construction and restoration. 34 
 In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy showed the New York Metropolitan Area the power of 
wind and water.35  The storm peaked at one thousand miles wide and left fifty billion dollars in 
                                                        
28 NJ RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT PLAN, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, (2013), available at 
http://www.nj.gov/recovery/infrastructure/acoe.html. 
29 Don Barber, Beach Nourishment Basics, COASTAL GEOLOGY AT BRYN MAWR COLLEGE, available at 
http://www.brynmawr.edu/geology/geomorph/beachnourishmentinfo.html. 
30 Spoto, supra note 26. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Jessica Vantine & Tiffany B. Zezula, The Beach Zone: Using Local Land Use Authority to Preserve Barrier 
Islands, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 309 (2002). 
34 Lauren Wanko, Ship Bottom Residents Reluctant to Sign Easements to Build Dunes, NJ TODAY (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://www.njtvonline.org/njtoday/video/ship-bottom-residents-reluctant-to-sign-easements-to-build-sand-dunes/. 
35 David M. Abramson & Irwin Redlener,  Hurricane Sandy: Lessons Learned, Again, 6 DISASTER MEDICINE AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS  (4th ed. 2012), 
file:///Users/ericagoldring/Downloads/Abramson_and_Redlener_Hurricane_Sandy_Lessons_Learned_Again_DMP
HP_2012.pdf. 
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damages in the aftermath.36  Though other areas of the United States have experienced more 
frequent, violent storms, the impact of Hurricane Sandy on one of the most populated areas in the 
country made it the second costliest Atlantic hurricane in history.37  The devastating consequences 
of natural resource depletion, destroyed homes, and lost lives facilitated the enactment of the 
federal Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, which included the Sandy Recovery 
Improvement Act (“SRIA”).38 
 SRIA allocated seventeen (17) billion dollars to federal agencies in immediate support to 
the victims and communities damaged by Hurricane Sandy.39  The NJDEP, in turn, was given the 
responsibility of acquiring the necessary property interests to carry out federal initiatives, including 
sand dune easements along the beachfront.40  For property owners that did not voluntarily provide 
easements, their property was to be “taken” under the authority of the Federal and New Jersey 
Constitutions. 
 B. Personal Property and Doctrinal Roots 
 The 5th Amendment of the Federal Constitution states, “no person shall be…deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”41  Further, the New Jersey Constitution, the controlling authority 
of the state, also provide that, “private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation.  Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property 
for public use without just compensation first made to the owners.”42  The Eminent Domain Act 
                                                        
36  Id. 
37 Shaddick Enders & Brandi Kalena, Sand Politics: Coastal Dunes against Property Rights in Post-Superstorm 
Sandy New Jersey, SETON HALL LAW EREPOSITORY (2014), http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/569.  
38 Disaster Appropriations Act, H.R. 152, 113th Cong. (2013). 
39 Id. 
40 Margate City v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 1:14-cv-07303 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 24, 2014). 
41 U.S. Const. amend. V, §2. 
42 N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, § 20.  
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of 1971, which further defines property as what can be loosely characterized as “real estate,” 
provides a four-step condemnation process that applies to all eminent domain proceedings.43  
Additionally, the Eminent Domain Act of 1971 proscribes the process for awarding just 
compensation, which is a term that is not defined by either the Federal or State Constitutions.44  It 
requires that redress granted to the property owner should reflect fair market value for a total taking 
or diminution in fair market value to the remainder parcel for a partial taking.45 
 The constitutional norm of just compensation is in accordance with property law’s concepts 
of stability.   In 1215, the Magna Carta read, “No constable or other of our bailiffs shall take corn 
or other chattels of any man without immediate payment, unless the seller voluntarily consents to 
postponement of payment.”46  This clause denotes that compensation was expected when the King 
took rations from the people.47  As history progressed, just compensation became a common 
feature of government that evolved into an established common law principle.48  As such, scholars 
have explained that the just compensation principle is grounded in natural law, identified by John 
Locke as the rights to “life, liberty, and property.”49 
 C. Property’s Philosophical Framework 
 John Locke is among one of the most influential political thinkers of the modern period.50  
His treatment of property is generally thought to be among his most important contributions in 
political thought.51  To understand Locke’s concept of natural law, one must travel back into the 
                                                        
43 N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 (1971). 
44 Id. 
45 City of Ocean City v. Maffucci, 740 A.2d 640, 641 (N.J. App. Div. 1999). 
46 James W. Ely, Jr., The Historical Context of Just Compensation: "Just Compensation" Does Not Necessarily 
Mean "Fair Compensation," THE PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE LAWYER 9 (2014). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 10 
50 Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2005), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/. 
51 Id. 
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state of nature.52  There, the governing law is that of reason, which bespeaks individual 
preservation and sustainment of others.53  According to Locke, each person has a responsibility to 
preserve mankind, so long as such efforts do not work against the individual himself.54  Locke’s 
concept of preservation is premised on the notion of secure individual rights.55  Among these is 
the right to property, something that is “justly” appropriated through self-ownership.56  
 To Locke, personal property is inextricably linked to the law of nature.57  Much of Locke’s 
thinking in this area focuses on the importance of the earth as a whole, which he views as the 
property of all the people in the world.58  It follows that Locke believes the earth must be justly 
appropriated to ensure the collective benefit and survival of all individuals.59  As such, Locke 
attempts to balance sustainability with personal property and ownership.60  In Two Treatises on 
Government, Locke wrote: 
 “The same law of Nature that does by this means give us property, does also 
bound that property too . . . As much as any one can make use of to any advantage 
of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor fix his property in. Whatever 
is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others . . . . So that, in effect, 
there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself. For he 
that leaves as much as another can make use of does as good as take nothing at all.” 
61 
 
Though written in 1698, the pillars of Locke’s work remain relevant to property law today.62  When 
exercising its eminent domain powers, the government often cites “public good” or “public 
                                                        
52 Paul J. Otterstedt, A Natural Rights Approach to Regulatory Takings, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 25, 31 (2002). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (Peter Laslett ed.) (3rd ed. 1698). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 John G. Sprankling, Understanding Property Law, LEXISNEXIS 21 (3rd ed. 2012). 
 9 
necessity” as a socially accepted justification for use of its sovereign power.63  Thus, the 
government’s check on individual property, when used to the detriment of others, mirrors Locke’s 
rhetorical question that asks, “ . . . May [anyone] engross [the earth] as much as he will? To which 
I answer, Not so.”64  Despite the individualist school of thought that one has the right to do with 
her property as she wishes, the personal right to property must compromise with the environmental 
interests of the community.65  Just compensation attempts to strike such a balance by protecting 
individuals from bearing public the burdens of climate change and natural accretion.66 
 D. Governmental Restrictions on Access to Private Property: Just Compensation 
 While the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions guarantee just compensation, or fair value, 
for any property taken, the more tumultuous issue often arising is whether the valuation method 
used to derive a monetary amount affords the litigant due process or unjust enrichment.67  It is well 
established that valuation methods in partial takings of easements are more complex than when 
dealing with an entire taking.68  New Jersey courts have generally followed one of two computation 
formulas: The “’Per Se’ Rule” or the “Before and After Rule.”69  The Per Se rule adds the market 
value of the land taken to the difference between the value of the remainder before and after the 
taking [Value of land taken + (value of remainder area before taking – value of remainder area 
after taking) = just compensation].70  The Before and After Rule merely computes damages as the 
difference between the value of the entire parcel before the taking and the remainder after the 
                                                        
63 Nasim Farjad, Condemnation Friendly or Land Use Wise? A Broad Interpretation of the Public Use Requirement 
Works Well for New York City, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1121 (2007). 
64 Locke, supra note 57. 
65 John T. Vaughan III, Just Compensation or Unjust Enrichment? Critiquing Attempts to Circumvent State 
Sovereignty in Regulatory Takings Law, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 324 (2001). 
66 Id. at 345. 
67 Robert C. Downie, II, Quasi - Judicial Proceedings and Constitutional Rights: What Is Happening to Separation 
of Powers?, FLA. B.J., 44, 45 (1997). 
68 21 N.J. Prac., Skills And Methods § 37:14 (3d ed.) (West 2015). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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taking [Value of entire parcel before taking – value of remainder parcel after taking = just 
compensation].71  Under both formulas, testimony of a real estate appraisal expert is required.72  
There are, however, a variety of limitations to awarding just compensation.   
Relevant to the issue of just compensation is the evidence of current and prospective uses 
of a partially condemned property.73  A real estate appraisal expert must consider both the use of 
the property at the time of the condemnation and its “highest and best use.”74  However, 
“[e]lements affecting value that depend upon events or combinations of occurrences which, while 
within the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be reasonably probable, should be excluded 
from consideration, for that would allow mere speculation and conjecture to become a guide for 
the ascertainment of value . . .”75  The highest and best use of a parcel must be considered under 
the applicable zoning regulations and typically reflect the legal value of the highest dollar 
amount.76 
Prior to 2013, New Jersey law was well settled as to the benefits that could offset just 
compensation.  General benefits, which are benefits produced by partial condemnation and shared 
in common with all other property owners in the area, could not affect an award of damages.77  
Special benefits, however, are benefits that accrue “directly and proximately” to the remainder 
parcel and are unique to the individual property owner.78  This distinction between general and 
special benefits previously prevented juries from hearing testimony about the benefits provided by 
                                                        
71 Id. 
72 Maffaucci, 740 A.2d at 638. 
73 Mark S. Dennison, Probable Zoning Change As Bearing On Proof Of Market Value In Eminent Domain 
Proceeding, 40 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 395 (West 2016). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Dennison, supra note 73. 
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partial takings implementing storm surge protection.79   
E. The Turning Point: Harvey Cedars and Beyond 
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan 
set a new valuation standard in partial takings cases.80  There, the Court held that just compensation 
must be based upon a consideration of “all relevant, reasonably calculable, and non-conjectural 
factors that either decrease or increase the value of the remaining property.”81  The issue in Karan 
concerned a partial condemnation proceeding against one of sixteen holdouts that refused to give 
the State a voluntary easement for sand dune construction across a Long Beach Island home.82  
The property-owners argued that the sand dune obstructed their panoramic oceanfront view, which 
decreased the market value of their coastal residence.83  The Borough, however, argued that the 
landowners obtained a benefit from the added storm protection that must be calculated into their 
compensation award.84 
The trial court found that the sand dune construction did not confer a special benefit to 
defendants, but rather a general benefit that protected Long Beach Island and its inhabitants from 
the “destructive impact of hurricanes and nor’easters.”85  As such, the jury awarded the Karans 
$375,000 in damages.86  The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the loss of oceanfront view 
was compensable and significantly reduced the market value of the property.87  Additionally, the 
new sand dune would occupy a strip of the Karan’s private beach property, resulting in loss of 
                                                        
79 Id. 
80 Borough of Harvery Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (2013). 
81 Id. at 527. 
82 Id. at 527-28. 
83 Id. at 530. 
84 Id. 
85 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 40 A.3d 75, 77 (N.J. App. Div. 2012) rev’d, 70 A.3d 524 (2013). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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recreational use.88  Citing to decade old New Jersey precedent, the Appellate Division followed 
City of Ocean City v. Maffucci in holding that “ocean view, beach access, use and privacy are 
fundamental considerations in valuing beachfront property.”89 
In Karan, the central question for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether the formula 
used by the courts below, which does not permit consideration of quantifiable benefits resulting 
from partial condemnation to increase the value of the remainder property, reflects the owner’s 
true loss.90  The high court disagreed, finding that the new sand dune conferred unique storm 
protection on the Karans.91  This departure from the historical valuation approach used by the 
lower courts reflects a dramatic change in eminent domain compensation.  Ultimately, the Karans 
settled for a symbolic one dollar ($1.00) for their loss.92  The decision in Karan implicates a new 
standard that now allows juries to hear a broader scope of evidence, drastically affecting the 
outcome of subsequent sand dune partial takings cases by lowering the compensation awards. 
Shortly after the seminal Karan decision, the New Jersey Appellate Division published two 
back-to-back appeals in Petrozzi v. City of Ocean City.93  Although not a condemnation case, 
Petrozzi made clear that Karan’s departure from the general versus special benefits approach to 
partial valuation would not be easily limited.  In Petrozzi, Ocean City sought a proactive approach 
to storm surge protection and beach replenishment.94  But rather than exercising its power of 
eminent domain, the City acquired voluntary easements for sand dunes from Ocean City’s property 
owners through use of a height restriction.95  The “easement agreements” were premised on the 
                                                        
88 Id. 
89 Id. quoting Malffucci, 740 A.2d at 641. 
90 Karan, 70 A.3d at 527.   
91 Id. at 532. 
92 Scott Salmon, Necessary Change: Recalculating Just Compensation for Environmental Benefits, 6 WASH. & LEE 
J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV'T 552, 581 (2015). 
93 Petrozzi v. City of Ocean City, 78 A.3d 998 (N.J. App.Div. 2013). 
94 Id. at 1002. 
95 Id. at 1002-03. 
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condition that the sand dune would not impede the landowners’ coastal view.96  Natural accretion, 
however, unsurprisingly caused the sand dunes to grow in size, exceeding their initial 
conformance.97  When the property owners’ showed concern over the dune’s enlargement, they 
learned that since their initial assent to the easement agreement, New Jersey had implemented the 
Coastal Area Facility Review Act (“CAFRA”).98  This statute required that the City get permission 
from the NJDEP before maintaining or reducing dune elevation.99  Subsequently, the City’s request 
for the necessary permit was denied by NJDEP due to “non compliance with government 
regulations.”100  This resulted in the landowners filing suit against Ocean City, alleging that the 
easement agreements were breached due to loss of beachfront view, access, and privacy.101 
The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded compensation for loss of 
view.102  The Appellate Division, however, remanded the case back to the trial court.103  In doing 
so, it instructed that, “the fixing of an appropriate restitutionary amount must consider the value 
of that which plaintiffs have been deprived, including loss of, or interference with, their ocean 
views due to the accretive effects.  But offset against the burdens suffered by plaintiffs are the 
potential gains conferred by the partial consideration performed by Ocean City to date, namely the 
non-speculative, reasonably calculable benefits arising from the municipality’s dune project.”104  
Thus, Petrozzi evidences the broadly precedential effect of the Karan valuation formula created 
by the New Jersey Supreme Court.   
About a year after the Appellate Division decided Petrozzi, it was clear that the scope and 
                                                        
96 Id. at 1002. 
97 Id. at 1003. 
98 Petrozzi, 78 A.3d at 1003. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1007. 
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application of the new valuation approach would extend down to New Jersey trial courts.  In 
Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Groisser, defendants sought an $800,000 award for the 
government’s partial condemnation of their property to create a sand dune easement.105  
Specifically, the Groissers argued that the easement was worth approximately $200,000, while 
their damages for loss of view was worth $600,000.106  Prior to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
holding in Karan, an Ocean County Superior Court jury awarded the plaintiffs $265,000.107  But 
after applying the new Karan standards and weighing the potential increase in property value 
resulting from the dune’s insulation, the Groissers were awarded a mere $300 on remand.108  
Acting Attorney General John J. Hoffman called the verdict “an important legal win for the state’s 
beachfront property efforts, for our vital natural resources along the coast, and for the citizens of 
New Jersey. . .”109  Clearly, the tide had turned on coastal residents. 
Part IV: New Approaches to Water Management: Moving Away from Sand Dunes and the 
Compensation Conundrum  
 
 A. Land Use Management: Moving Away from Water 
 
Though it appears that the new valuation approach will prevent windfalls to property 
owners and further the public coastal replenishment initiative, some scholars suggest that these 
efforts produce latent difficulties.  Professor Daniel D. Barnhizer of Harvard University believes 
that current governmental responses to rising sea levels will not ultimately diminish flood 
                                                        
105 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Groisser, No. L-001429-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. June 24, 2014). 
106 Patricia A. Miller, Harvey Cedars Couple Sought $800,000 For Dune Easement, Jury Awards $300, BARNAGET-
MANAHAWKIN PATCH (July 1, 2014, 2:06PM), http://patch.com/new-jersey/barnegat-manahawkin/harvey-cedars-
couple-sought-800000-for-dune-easement-jury-awards-300. 
107 Donna Weaver, Jury Awards Harvey Cedars Couple $300 For Easement To Complete Dune Project, THE PRESS 
OF ATLANTIC CITY (June 30, 2014, 5:30PM), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/breaking/jury-awards-
harvey-cedars-couple-for-easement-to-complete-dune/article_d0ba717a-009d-11e4-bf66-0019bb2963f4.html. 
108 Id. 
109 Statement of John J. Hoffman, N.J. Att’y Gen., N.J. Wins Another Cheap Easement of Beach Dune Project, LAW 
360 (Sept. 22, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://law360.com/articles/553508/nj-wins-another-cheap-easement-for-beach-
dune-project. 
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damages.110  Rather, he argues that, over the next 20 years approximately 26 million people will 
become seaside property residents under the mistaken belief that their homes are shielded from 
natural disasters by government protection mechanisms.111  Currently, over half of the American 
population lives in coastal counties that amount to only seventeen percent of habitable land.112  
Little do they know, government action such as beach replenishment projects and partial 
condemnation for sand dune easements have unintended consequences that actually increase 
potential beachfront damage.113   
It is well established that flooding is the leading cause of natural disaster damage in the 
United States.114  However, such damage would not exist without human development in the 
floodplains.115  Floodplains are defined as  
“uniquely impermanent and changeable landforms, subject to destruction or 
catastrophic alteration through erosion during flood events.  Oceanfront property. . 
.is eroding constantly and hundreds of feet of beach may disappear in a single 
storm.  Compared to “dry” real estate that remains permanently in place and 
responds only to tectonic forces, floodplains are not “real land,” but rather may 
disappear under the property owner’s feet at any time.”116   
 
Despite this, over 50% of the American population lives within 50 miles of the coast.117 
This increasing ratio does not explain how beachfront property owners understand and deal 
with the uncertainties of flood damage.  Though property law and self-ownership depend on 
concepts of stability,118 it appears that beachfront homeowners are not concerned with changing 
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weather patterns, rising sea levels, and global warming.119  What is the reason for this 
inconsistency?  “Givings,” defined as government actions that increase the value of private 
property, may be the answer to individuals’ false sense of shelter.120  In the context of coastal 
protection, givings encompass sand replenishment projects like those discussed in Karan, Petrozzi, 
and Groisser.121  These public projects are known as “structural mitigation” responses to flooding, 
which are mechanisms designed to prevent or reverse erosion of the floodplain.122  Two of the 
primary issues related to structural mitigation givings like sand dunes include (1) who should retain 
the increased value to private property, and (2) when can the government force owners to pay or 
forego compensation for the measureable benefits of givings.123  These questions must be 
considered in the context of the Karan valuation standard and subsequent cases that follow the 
new damages formula. 
Sand dunes are structural mitigation givings in two ways: they are “direct givings” and 
“fiat givings.”124  Sand dunes offer beach armor and are considered a “direct giving” because they 
counteract the dangerous effects of flood damage through soft barriers.125  In turn, property owners 
underestimate the danger of flood risks under the misconception that they are protected from water 
damage entirely.126  Due to these beliefs, property values for coastal properties rise as a result of 
government’s structural mitigation techniques.127  The market does not yet account for a 
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relationship between land values and flood risk.128  Sand dunes are also considered fiat givings 
because property owners believe they have the government’s guarantee that their property will 
continue to exist.129  Fiat givings are “givings that result where the government declares . . . that it 
will not permit a floodplain landowner’s property to move, erode, or disappear.  By declaring its 
intent to guard floodplain properties against future encroachments by nature, government has in 
effect created ‘dry’ land by fiat . . . .” backed by the full faith and credit of the federal or state 
government . . .””130  There is “government-created reliance that the existing state of [protection] 
will be maintained.”131 
The categorization of sand dunes as “direct” and “fiat” givings begs the question whether 
the government must pay for these self-created givings when they purchase or take private property 
for public use.132  In other words, will government have to pay for increased value that it has 
created?  Although givings, like ecosystems, are extremely difficult to value monetarily, it appears 
that New Jersey has taken the position that government should not have to pay increased costs for 
implementing conservation structures.  This is reflected by the new just compensation valuation 
approach initially established in Karan. 
One of the primary justifications for creating a new valuation standard in Karan was that 
“homeowners are entitled to the fair market value of their loss, not to a windfall, not to a pay out 
that disregards the home’s enhanced value resulting from a public project.”133  Aside from 
concerns about property owners’ unjust enrichment for sand dune easements, hefty compensation 
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for government flood responses may distort market reactions to flood risks.134  This reinforces 
market misconceptions about residential development of floodplains and discourages property 
owners’ independent use of protective measures.135  “Additionally, overcompensation further 
shifts the risk of flood losses to taxpayers, requiring them to subsidize the decisions of floodplain 
property owners at even greater rates.”136  All together, these factors require government entities 
to continue maintaining and building structural flood controls.137  But as Professor Barnhizer 
points out, more beachfront residential ownership is induced by dune creation that sends the 
message that ownership is safe and secure.138 
To combat the perpetual problem of costly flood damages, Professor Barnhizer argues that 
a land use management approach, rather than a structural mitigation approach, is most 
appropriate.139  Land use management is a proactive, non-crisis focused decision-making process 
that focuses on current and future floodplain occupation.140  This method maximizes the 
economically beneficial use of floodplains while minimizing the economic loss related to human 
residential development.141 Although this strategy is best implemented before the expanse of 
coastal homes is as far-reaching as it is today, a modified exercise of land use management must 
be applied in place of current structural mitigation techniques that are unsustainable.142 A recent 
study indicates that a quarter of all homes within 500 feet of the coast will be subject to shoreline 
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erosion and flooding within the next sixty years.143  However, before attempting an effective land 
management plan, the proper regulations and economic incentives must be put into place to start 
to change the American way of thinking about residential development and investment.144 
Significant changes suggested by Professor Barnhizer include (1) public acquisition of floodplain 
property; (2) government compensation for property owners’ legitimate expectations, not 
“givings” attributable to government flood response; and (3) government must establish a federal 
property acquisition program aimed at high-risk or environmentally valuable floodplain 
properties.145 
These proposed reforms should begin with immediate prohibitions to residential flood plan 
development through land use restrictions such as zoning and police power regulations.146 
Although these regulations may be authorized by statute, the public-trust doctrine and ancient 
nuisance law serve as alternate justifications.147 The public-trust doctrine requires that the state 
hold its coastal resources in a perpetual trust for the public benefit.148 Though this doctrine 
originally meant to preserve the shorelines for navigation, commerce, and public recreation, “there 
is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands . . . is 
the preservation of those lands in their natural state.”149 The trust attaches to the coast, wherever it 
moves.150 Thus, as sea levels rise and coastal properties are flooded, the public-trust doctrine 
                                                        
143 Id.; John H. Heinz III, Ctr. for Sci., Econ. & the Env't, Evaluation of Erosion Hazards xxi, 128 (2000). 
144 Jancaitis, supra note 112, at 187. 
145 Barnhizer, supra note 110. 
146 Id. 
147 Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. 
L. REV. 627 (1989). 
148 Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem Loss, and Public Access 
Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 551 (2007). 
149 Id. at 553; quoting James M. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save the 
Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1368 (1998). 
150 Id. at 553. 
 20 
requires that private property give way to shoreline erosion.151 Moreover, sand dunes and other 
structural mitigation techniques run the risk of impeding on this common law principle. By 
artificially preventing the tide from moving freely, the public is being denied its reversionary trust 
interest in the beach.152  
Basic nuisance principals also support coastal property regulation changes. According to 
the Restatement, “[a] public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the 
general public . . . . Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public 
right is unreasonable include . . . whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a 
permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant 
effect upon a public right.”153 This definition could easily encompass current coastal problems, 
including both residential overdevelopment and sand dune storm “protection.” By recognizing 
particular harms such as increased erosion, visual blight, loss of beachfront, and the creation of 
physically hazardous flood risks, the suggested prohibitions on coastal development align with the 
goals of common law nuisance.  
By grounding coastal land development regulation in the public trust doctrine and basic 
nuisance principles, the government will be immunized from constitutional takings challenges.154 
Though some property rights activists have suggested that courts unfairly impose these common 
law doctrines against private property interests, history shows us that the public trust doctrine is 
inherent in the chain of title of all New Jersey properties that boarder waterways.155 “It is not an 
imposition on the property owner but part of the nature of his or her property.”156 Therefore, the 
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government has the freedom to take a direct approach to preventing development in the dangerous 
floodplains.157  James Titus, a scholar on the rising sea level, has advocated for the merits of rolling 
conservation easements to prohibit flood control structures like sand dunes.158 The idea behind 
rolling easements is that since it is unrealistic to prevent coastal development altogether, an 
alternative is to allow development with the conscious understanding that land will be abandoned 
when and if the sea level rises enough to submerge it.159 This is a way of averting or mitigating 
prospective violations of the public trust doctrine or public nuisances.  In stark contrast to the 
easements perpetuated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and taken in Karan, these rolling 
easements are intended to counter the false sense of coastal property protection resulting from 
current government givings. Without dunes and other structural mitigation forms, flood damage 
will occur naturally and the risk factor will be directly reflected in the beachfront residential 
housing market.160  As such, concerns about government condemnation discussed in Karan and 
beyond will no longer exist, and the market will adjust to the natural and inevitable future of rising 
seas.   
States like Maine, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas currently regulate their 
shorelines through rolling easements.161 In these states, the government holds an easement that 
allows for beachfront development on the condition that, if the sea rises to dangerous levels, the 
structure will be removed.162 This “build at your own risk” approach puts landowners on notice 
that the future of their coastal properties is unpredictable, but like the changing climate, carry an 
inevitable fate. 
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Not surprisingly, aspects of land use management have roots in national policy initiatives. 
Specifically, the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”), a congressional declaration of 
national policy, mandates that states protect their natural resources and manage shoreline 
development to minimize loss of life and property.163  Though this policy has not been widely 
acknowledged in New Jersey, other states have taken steps in a direction likely to gain the approval 
of Professor Barnhizer and other coastal management proponents.  Nagshead, North Carolina, for 
example, has adopted a land development moratorium following natural disasters.164  There, during 
the thirty days following a disaster, zoning laws and disaster mitigation strategies may be adopted 
in response to the changing environment.165 All subsequent land use development must comply 
with these new standards.166  Similarly, environmentalists in Maine are concerned with protecting 
their shorelines.167  Unlike New Jersey’s active use of structural mitigation techniques as 
protections for beachfront development, Maine’s Coastal Sand Dunes Law (“MCSDL”) is highly 
precautionary.168  The MCSDL requires that before new structures are built on the coast, there 
must be accountability for environmental concerns including sea level rise, changing shorelines, 
and wildlife habitat.169  And unlike New Jersey’s efforts to rebuild the damage caused by Hurricane 
Sandy in the same manner as before, Maine requires permits and approvals to relocate and rebuild 
structures severely damaged by natural disasters.170 
 
 
                                                        
163 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2) (2006). 
164 John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation Through Land Use Strategies, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 959, 974 (2006). 
165 Id. at 975. 
166 Id. 
167 Jancaitis, supra note 112, at 188. 
168 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 480-D (2007). 
169 Id. 
170 355 ME. CODE R. § 5(c) (Weil 2007). 
 23 
B. Designing With Water, Not Against It 
In considering the proper techniques for a new land use management initiative, it may be 
reasonable to look to the Netherlands’ approach to water management. Unlike America, Europe 
has focused on climate change as a major public concern for more than a decade.171 As such, the 
Dutch have already radically adapted their infrastructure to the rising seas.172 Because 
approximately half of the Netherlands lies below sea level,173 it has developed a communal society 
of flood planning in every region.174 Not only are three out of every five Dutch citizens living at 
or below sea level, but two-thirds of products in the Dutch economy are produced in areas 
threatened by such climate change.175  In fact, the Dutch motto is “Water should get space before 
it takes it!,” which may be attributable to a governmental public relations campaign called 
“Nederland left met water” (“The Netherlands lives with water”.) 176  In contrast to the American 
system of individualism, Dutch cities do not have the autonomy given to American municipalities 
by way of unique protection mechanisms.177 Rather, Dutch water management and the finance 
system behind it are highly decentralized and focus on adaptation.178  The Dutch are now using 
innovative building techniques such as the construction of floating houses and office buildings, 
and digging craters that will act as storage for runoff.179  Additionally, the Dutch have included 
water management as a central feature to their urban development plans.180  For example, Dutch 
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cities are building reservoirs under their parking garages as a way of guarding against flood 
risks.181 And according to the European Commission, the Dutch factor in both environmental and 
resource costs to the cost of water services.182  Much of this forward thinking water management 
is attributable to the director of the Netherland’s Office of Spatial Planning and Water 
Management, Henk Ovink.183 
Ovink believes that water management is something that American culture does not yet 
grasp.184  Policy-makers and environmentalists are more focused on preventing global warming 
than planning for its effects.185  After observing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers rebuild storm 
walls and dunes destroyed by Hurricane Sandy, he questioned why America continues to use the 
same flood protection mechanisms that have already failed.186  This is a high-risk, low-utility 
practice of coastal development.187  Rather, Ovink sees the acceptance of climate change is a new 
way of life.188  In an effort to harness new energy from a range of innovative thinkers, he created 
a competition called “Rebuild by Design,” which allowed experts to redevelop areas of flood 
damage.”189  Among a plethora of “Dutch-like” ideas, the competitors imagined ways to 
decentralize electricity and utilities, which allows homes to sustain a storm.190  Another idea called 
for a U shape of parks and retraction walls around lower Manhattan.191  For New Jersey beach 
towns, the experts imagined a total upgrade of water storage capabilities and different dunes and 
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sea barriers.192  In Hoboken, Ovink encouraged vegetation on roofs to soak up rainwater and 
permeable sidewalks.193  Additionally, his experts are working on a “mesh network” of Wi-Fi as a 
new communication system.194  In the face of a new water management crisis, the Dutch system 
of regional planning may be attractive to Americans that foresee the danger of the upcoming 
storms. 
IV. Conclusion 
Rather than perpetuating the current coastal water management system, there must be a 
total restructuring of America’s understanding of flood risk and protection.  Instead of fighting the 
earth’s natural progression of rising sea levels, civilization must find away to conform to it.  This 
requires a closer integration of American branches of government, a hierarchical planning 
structure, and the attachment of funds to adaptation and climate-focused planning opportunities.195  
Property ownership rests in concepts of stability and individual rights, but our current conservation 
projects will never exist in harmony with individual residents.  Until a new plan is implemented, 
the government will continue to counter beach erosion by taking or using property easements for 
flood structures.  This country is seeking new legislation and policy initiatives that are forward 
thinking towards water management, rather than putting resources towards unnecessary litigation 
like Karan.  By changing the standards for just compensation, the government has found a way to 
conserve funds and prohibit property owners “unjust enrichment.”  But with a new water 
management system, the government will be able to create a system that is sustainable and realistic, 
ultimately saving far more money than the ambiguous compensation scheme debuted in Karan.   
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